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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Support And Maintenance Of Minors:
A Father's Liability For Extraordinary Expenses
Wagner v. Wagner'
A mother petitioned for modification of alimony and support pro-
visions of a judgment of separation, which had been entered in 1954
and resettled in 1957. The Special Referee found that " '. . . under the
present conditions, high school and college educations have become a
necessity rather than a luxury,' "2 and therefore decided that a twenty
year old daughter, who was in college, and an eighteen year old son,
who would graduate from high school that year and enter college in
the fall, should be maintained in college and private school until each
was twenty-one. In addition, he ordered the father to pay for his
daughter's orthodontia expenses. The father appealed these findings.
The appellate court, granting the father's motions, found that as a
matter of fact and law he was under no obligation to send his children
to private boarding schools and college. Relevant factors considered
were the mother's job and substantial income, -the father's past fulfill-
ment of his support obligations, the attendance of both children at a
public high school from 1960-63, and thereafter the son's attendance
at a private boarding school with tuition being voluntarily paid by the
mother, without consultation of the father. "Decisional law holds that
a father is not required to pay for his child's private school tuition
where the community makes available to children through the public
school system the education which each child is entitled to as a matter
of course. . . ."' The court found further that a father has no legal
duty to provide his children a college education; unless a father ex-
pressly agrees to send 'his children to college, his obligation to do so
is a moral one only.4 In addition, since 'the extent of the daughter's
needed dental care was undetermined, the court, feeling such an order
to 'be speculative, refused to compel the father to pay the dental ex-
penses which his daughter might incur in the future. He was, however,
ordered to pay the orthodontia expenses incurred by his daughter prior
to the date of decision. The opinion ended with the statement: "In
view of the foregoing, no counsel fee is allowed herein."' In reaching
its decision, the court apparently did not consider a very detailed New
York statute under which it might have granted the mother's petition.6
Blackstone stated the extent of parental obligations as follows:
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their
children is a principle of natural law; (3) an obligation, says
1. 51 Misc. 2d 574, 273 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
2. 273 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
3. Ibid.
4. 273 N.Y.S.2d at 574-76.
5. 273 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
6. "Father liable for support of his child or children under twenty-one years of
age; . . ." CONS. LAWS Op N.Y. ANN. art. 3-A, § 32(2) (1964). "The court . ..
shall have the power to order the respondent to pay sums sufficient to provide necessaryfood, shelter, clothing, care, medical or hospital expenses, . . . , expenses of education
of a child, funeral expenses ... having due regard to the circumstances of the respective
parties." CoNs. LAWS OF N.Y. ANN. art. 3-A, § 34(2) (1964).
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Puffendorf, (f) laid on them not only by nature herself, but by
their own proper act, in bringing them into the world: .... By
begetting them, therefore, they have entered into a voluntary
obligation to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life which
they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved. And thus
the children will have the perfect right of receiving maintenance
from their parents .... No person is bound to provide a mainte-
nance for his issue, (14) unless where the children are impotent
and unable to work, . . . through infancy . . . , and then is only
obliged to find them with necessaries, ... 7
Necessaries which a father must provide have always included
food, clothing and shelter,' and, usually, education.9 In the past, how-
ever, a father's duty to provide an education for his child extended no
further than the public education provided by the state or city,"0
although occasionally liability for private school expenses has been
imposed." Thus, the court in the principal case was following the
traditional view. In addition, it did not impose liability on the father
for -two other expenses, which might be termed extraordinary: college
education and legal expenses. There has not been much litigation con-
cerning imposition of liability for unusual expenses on a father; how-
ever, concerning college education, legal, medical, and funeral ex-
penses, varying lines of authority have developed.
COLLEGE EDUCATION
The duty of a parent to provide a college education for a child
is not as exacting a requirement as the duty to provide food, cloth-
ing and shelter for a child of tender years unable to support
himself. It is a natural law that a parent should spare no personal
sacrifice to feed and protect his offspring."2
Middlebury College v. Chandler,"8 decided in 1844 and recog-
nized as the leading case on the subject, enunciates the view that college
7. BLACKSTON4, COMMENTARIeS 419, 422 (Lewis' ed. 1922).
8. Crafts v. Carr, 24 R.I. 397, 53 Aft. 275, 279 (1902) (dictum). See generally
MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoMESTIc RELATIONS §§ 110-11 (1931); ScHOULyR, LAW OF
TH4 DoMESTIc RLATIONS §§ 241-42 (5th ed. 1895).
9. "The last duty of parents to their children is that of giving them an education
suitable to their station in life: . . ." 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 450 (Lewis' ed.
1922) ; Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 Pac. 264, 265 (1926), 246 Pac. 27 (1926).
Covault v. Nevitt, 157 Wis. 113, 146 N.W. 1115, 1117 (1914), found necessaries to be
those things which supply the personal needs of the child.
10. ". . . [A] father is under no legal duty to send his son to a boarding school,
no matter what his financial circumstances may be .... A father, unless his parental
authority has been taken away by the courts, is the one to decide the extent of the
education of his child, beyond what is provided by the school system of the state."
Ziesel v. Ziesel, 93 N.J. Eq. 153, 115 Atl. 435, 437 (1921).
11. Hilliard v. Hilliard, 197 Ill. 549, 64 N.E. 326 (1902), where daughter had
been in private school for two years prior to the parents' divorce; Wells v. Wells,
6 Div. 721, 161 So. 794 (1935), where the decree included a reasonable contribution
to the son's expensive private school education.
12. Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Sommerville, 200 Pa. Super. 640, 190 A.2d
182, 184 (1963).
13. 16 Vt. 683 (1844).
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education is not a necessary. Although the case is concerned with an
infant's contractual liability to pay for his college education, the dis-
cussion of necessaries in this context was equally applicable to a con-
sideration of the father's 'liability:
[A] good common school education . . . is now fully recog-
nized as one of the necessaries for an infant .... But it is obvious
that the more extensive attainments in literature and science must
be viewed in a light somewhat different. Though they tend greatly
to elevate and adorn personal character, are a source of much
private enjoyment, and may justly expect to prove of public utility,
yet in reference to men in general they are far from being neces-
sary in a legal sense. The mass of our citizens pass through life
without them. . . . I speak only of the regular and full course of
collegiate study; . . . . Now it does not appear that extraneous
circumstances existed in the defendant's case, such as wealth, or
station in society, or -that he exhibited peculiar indications of
genius or talent, which would suggest the fitness and expediency
of a college education for him, more than for the generality of
youth in the community.' 4
In an 1899 New Jersey decision, a father was not required to
finance his son's law school education because "professional training
is not a general necessity, but is a special advantage."'" A New York
court imposed no duty on a father to support eighteen year old twin
daughters who were in college and working. While the court recog-
nized that under unusual circumstances a father might be required to
furnish a college or professional education to his child, it found no
such duty when -the child was emancipated. 16 More recently, a Penn-
sylvania court denied that support payments be increased to cover the
cost of tuition, because the chosen college was "... in the nature of a
finishing school.' 1 7
A few older cases created an exception to the general rule when
the college education was desired because the child had some special
aptitude and/or desired specific vocational preparation.' Some juris-
dictions have based their decisions on the presence of statutory authori-
zation.'" Others, finding that college education is not a necessary,
14. Id. at 686.
15. Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 58 N.J. Eq. 570, 43 At. 904, 907 (1899).
16. Halsted v. Halsted, 228 App. Div. 298, 239 N.Y.S. 422 (1930). It should be
noted that while the principal case follows the Halsted decision, other lower courts in
New York have not always done so. E.g., Herbert v. Herbert, 198 Misc. 515, 98
N.Y.S.2d 846 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950); Weingast v. Weingast, 44 Misc. 2d 952, 255N.Y.S.2d 341 (Fam. Ct. 1964), having cited Halsted: "However, the Court takes into
consideration that that case was decided in 1930 and times have changed drastically
since then." Id. at 343.
17. Commonwealth v. Wingert, 173 Pa. Super. 613, 98 A.2d 203, 205 (1953).
18. Refer v. Refer, 102 Mont. 121, 56 P.2d 750 (1936), where son wanted to study
electrical engineering; Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 Pac. 264 (1926), 246 Pac.27 (1926), where daughter had high academic aptitude and wanted to become an
English teacher; Feek v. Feek, 187 Wash. 573, 60 P.2d 686 (1936), where son wanted
to study forestry.
19. E.g., Rawley v. Rawley, 94 Cal. App. 2d 562, 210 P.2d 891 (1949); Pass v.
Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 118 So. 2d 769 (1960). See 21 MD. L. Rxv. 84 (1961).
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have been unable to construe their support statutes to include it.20
Pennsylvania, in the past, found a duty only if the father expressly or
impliedly agreed to provide his child a college education. 21
The modern trend, based on a public policy argument, 22 is to find
that college education is a necessary which the father should be required
to provide. The particular facts of each case are nevertheless determi-
native. Controlling factors may be the educational background of the
parents, 23 ". . . the financial condition of the parent, the ability of the
minor for college work, the age of the minor, whether the child is
self-sustaining or not, the father's willingness to provide an education
and other factors. '24 With regard to the child's ability, grades are
not the only evidence to consider; ". . . attitude, character, desire for
learning, and well-directed ambition are important. '25  The father's
financial circumstances, however, probably have the most bearing on
the court's decision. Even though college education is considered to
be a necessary, a father will generally not be required to finance it if
he cannot afford it, or he may be required to provide only partial
payment.26
In most cases the procedure used to compel payment of college
expenses is modification of a child support order. The result is that
weekly or monthly support payments are increased by an amount con-
sidered reasonable, in light of the father's financial circumstances, to
cover the increased expenses of the child. It should be noted that these
support payments will terminate when the child reaches statutory
20. E.g., Haag v. Haag, 240 Ind. 291, 163 N.E.2d 243 (1959): "The Legislature
has met and adjourned six times since the decision in the Hachat case, and it has done
nothing to change the rule as announced in the Morris case and followed in the Hachat
case." 163 N.E.2d at 248; Hachat v. Hachat, 117 Ind. App. 294, 71 N.E.2d 927 (1947) ;
Morris v. Morris, 92 Ind. App. 65, 171 N.E. 386 (1930) ; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 81 Ohio
Abs. 88, 158 N.E.2d 546 (1959).
21. Express agreement: Commonwealth v. Martin, 196 Pa. Super. 355, 175 A.2d
138 (1961) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Stomel v. Stomel, 180 Pa. Super. 573, 119 A.2d
597 (1956). Implied agreement: Commonwealth v. Camp, 201 Pa. Super. 484, 193
A.2d 685 (1963); Commonwealth ex rel. Howell v. Howell, 198 Pa. Super. 396, 181
A.2d 903 (1962) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Grossman v. Grossman, 188 Pa. Super. 236,
146 A.2d 315 (1958). For a discussion of the Pennsylvania decisions, see Note, 67
DIcic. L. Rzv. 200 (1963).
22. Aside from this personal reason for encouraging higher learning for our youth
there is today's imperative reason of public welfare .... A changing world has
shattered the old concept that a higher education is a luxury to be enjoyed only
by the rich. Preparing our youth for possible service in the ranks of the creators
and developers of civilization has become an imperative necessity. . . . What was
once the "exception" has become commonplace. . . . We hold that considering
the progress of society and our nation's need for citizens educated in the humani-
ties and the sciences, a college education is a necessary where the minor's ability
and prospects justify it.
Calogeras v. Calogeras, 82 Ohio Abs. 438, 163 N.E.2d 713, 719-20 (1959), which
contains a good analysis of prior case law. See 35 NoTRE DAME LAw. 573 (1960).
23. Decker v. Decker, 204 Pa. Super. 156, 203 A.2d 343, 345 (1964).
24. Gerk v. Gerk, 144 N.W.2d 104, 109 (Iowa 1966). E.g., Hoffman v. Hoffman,
210 A.2d 549 (D.C. App. 1965).
25. Jackman v. Short, 165 Ore. 626, 109 P.2d 860, 872 (1941), which contains a
good analysis of prior case law.
26. E.g., Brown v. Weidner, 208 Pa. Super. 114, 220 A.2d 382 (1966) ; Rice v.
Rice, 206 Pa. Super. 393, 213 A.2d 179 (1965) ; Ulmer v. Sommerville, 200 Pa. Super.
640, 190 A.2d 182 (1963), where the court also considered the fact that an uncle had
provided each child with a substantial educational trust fund; Jackman v. Short, 165
Ore. 626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941).
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majority, and therefore, the father will not be required to pay all of
the child's college expenses. A few courts, however, have reached
other solutions: one ordered that the increased support payments con-
tinue ". . until each son has attended college four years, unless they
both sooner discontinue school or college .." ;27 another ordered pay-
ment of $2,500 per college year for the college expenses of a minor
daugther ;28 while still another ordered payment of $25 a month up to
$1,500 into a fund since "as the boy reaches the age of eighteen years,
he may desire a vocational, technical, or professional education ....




One Maryland case has required a father to pay for support of his
minor son in college. Smith v. Smith0 involved an appeal from an
order of permanent alimony, which provided, in part, that the father
pay $12.50 a week for his nineteen year old son, who was in Morgan
State College, and who the father alleged was of employable age and
able to support himself. In affirming the order, the court stated:
[T]he financial circumstances of the parties, their station in
life, and the expense of educating the children are among the
factors to be considered. The record before us shows that a college
education for the children has been afforded as an incident of the
station in life of this family, and the father is financially able to pay
the modest allowance made for the minor son while attending col-
lege, until ,he attains his majority, when the obligation will cease. 3'
The award, like most, was in the nature of support and, therefore,
means, as noted above, that the father was not required to pay expenses
incident to the child's entire college education.
FUNERAL EXPENSES
Funeral expenses are generally considered to be a necessary for
which a father is liable. This conclusion has been reached in many
cases in which the parent sues a third party for the wrongful death of
his child. Although such damages are not recoverable under wrongful
death statutes, 82 courts have held that since a father has a duty to pay
the funeral expenses of a minor child who lives with him and since he
is therefore liable to third persons furnishing the funeral services, he
may recover in a separate action against a tortfeasor or insurer.83
27. Hart v. Hart, 239 Iowa 142, 30 N.W.2d 748, 751 (1948).
28. Matthews v. Matthews, 30 Misc. 2d 681, 222 N.Y.S.2d 31 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
This award was not appealed, but the court mentions it as part of the support order.
29. Underwood v. Underwood, 162 Wash. 204, 298 Pac. 318, 320 (1931).
30. 227 Md. 355, 176 A.2d 862 (1962).
31. Id. at 361, 176 A.2d at 866.
32. See, e.g., MD. CODz ANN. art. 67, §§ 1, 4 (1966). Graul v. Adrian, 49 Ill.
App. 2d 101, 199 N.E.2d 631 (1964).
33. Graul v. Adrian, 32 Ill. 2d 345, 205 N.E.2d 444 (1965) (overruling Wright v.
Royse, 43 Ill. App. 2d 267, 193 N.E.2d 340 (1963)) ; Venable v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
142 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 1962) ; Munsert v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 229 Wis.




Other cases have imposed direct liability to third persons on a father
since ". . . the funeral expense incident to the burying of a minor child
is to be classed as a necessity. . . ."" One court found that a father's
liability is removed by a third person's express contract to pay for the
child's funeral expenses."
In Maryland, a father may presumably be required to reimburse
the mother of his deceased minor child for funeral expenses incurred
for the child's burial. Kriedo v. Kriedo"6 concerned a mother's petition
in equity for payment to her of medical and funeral expenses incurred
for the child. Having stated that a father's liability for medical ex-
penses was to the person rendering the service, the court found no
distinction between that claim and the mother's for ". . . funeral serv-
ices rendered the deceased child at the mother's request, and which
have been paid by her."" The court held, however, that such recovery
could not be had in equity but was properly the subject of an action
at law.
MEDICAL EXPENSES
Although the particular facts in each case are determinative,
medical care has almost universally been classified as a necessary
which a father is obligated to provide, and a third person supplying
medical and dental care to a minor child can properly recover its value
from a father in a civil action."" The theory underlying such action was
stated in Porter v. Powell :
It is the legal as well as moral duty of parents to furnish
necessary support to their children during minority; . . . a parent
cannot be charged for necessaries furnished by a stranger for his
minor child, except on an express or implied promise to pay for the
same; . . . such a promise may be inferred on the grounds of the
legal duty imposed.4
If a child is in his father's custody and control, or if the father exercises
general care and protection for the child, he must pay for medical ex-
penses incurred,4 and the child's estate cannot be bound.42
The basis of recovery is sometimes otherwise stated as an implied
authority of agency, that is, an agency of necessity which arises upon a
father's refusal to provide the care needed.4" This theory is usually not
interpreted as strictly as in Thompson v. Perr,44 where a dentist sued
34. Rose Funeral Home, Inc. v. Julian, 176 Tenn. 534, 144 S.W.2d 755, 757 (1940).
E.g., Rowe v. Raper, 23 Ind. App. 27, 54 N.E. 770 (1899) ; Colovos' Adm'r v. Gouvas,
269 Ky. 752, 108 S.W.2d 820 (1937); Hunycutt & Co. v. Thompson, 159 N.C. 29, 74
S.E. 628 (1912).35. Barry Funeral Home v. Norris, 216 Miss. 457, 62 So. 2d 768 (1953).
36. 159 Md. 229, 150 Atl. 720 (1930).37. Id. at 233, 150 Atl. at 722.
38. See, e.g., Osborn v. Weatherford, 27 Ala. App. 258, 170 So. 95 (1936).39. 79 Iowa 151, 44 N.W. 295 (1890), where the duty was imposed even though
daughter was seventeen and lived and worked away from home.
40. Id. at 296.
41. E.g., Osborn v. Weatherford, 27 Ala. App. 258, 170 So. 95 (1936).
42. Foster v. Adcock, 161 Tenn. 217, 30 S.W.2d 239 (1930).
43. Owen v. Watson, 157 Tenn. 352, 8 S.W.2d 484 (1928).
44. 238 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. App. 1951).
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a father for payment for thirteen fillings and treatment of an abscessed
tooth. The services were requested by the child's mother, who had not
consulted the father, and although the court found the treatment to be
a necessary, it stated:
Except for an emergency which renders a third person's immediate
interference both reasonable and proper, an implied promise to
pay for necessaries must depend upon the father's failure or refusal
to supply them; and where he is ready and willing to make suitable
provision for his child, there can be no recovery by a third person
who 'has furnished the necessaries without his express authority...
the 'basis of the father's liability is his omission to fulfill his obliga-
tion of supporting his child. . .. "
The question of a father's responsibility for medical expenses
often arises, as in college education cases, upon application by a mother
for modification of a support order. Unlike the principal case, many
courts have modified support orders to include provisions for medical
expenses in futuro.46 Other cases follow the line of decisions concern-
ing funeral expenses and allow recovery for out-of-pocket payment
from a tortfeasor or insurer on the grounds that medical expenses are
a necessary for which a father is legally liable.47 A father has been
allowed recovery against a tavern owner, under a Dram Shop Act,4"
for medical expenses incurred ,by his child because of the parent's
statutorily imposed liability for the medical expenses.49
In Maryland, Kriedo v. Kriedo5° indicated that a father is liable
for medical expenses incurred on behalf of his minor child. His re-
sponsibility for medical bills which have not been paid is to the doctor
who rendered the medical service, and his liability for bills already
paid by the mother is to her:
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the father is primarily liable
for the extraordinary necessary expenses shown to have been in-
curred for the benefit of his deceased minor child, which liability
is to the persons rendering the service in cases where those ren-
dering service have not been paid, and that the mother is entitled
to reimbursement from the father in those cases in which pay-
ment has been made by her, but that upon the refusal of the father
45. Id. at 25.
46. E.g., Kuespert v. Roland, 222 Ark. 153, 257 S.W.2d 562 (1953) ; Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 81 Ohio Abs. 88, 158 N.E.2d 546 (1959) ; Commonwealth v. Warner, 198 Pa.
Super. 124, 181 A.2d 888 (1962).
47. Graul v. Adrian, 32 Ill. 2d 345, 205 N.E.2d 444 (1965). See, e.g., Hickey v.
Insurance Co. of North America, 239 F. Supp. 109 (E.D. Tenn. 1965); Doss v.
Sewell, 257 N.C. 404, 125 S.E.2d 899 (1962).
48. The sections of the Illinois liquor control statute applicable to this case pro-
hibit the sale of alcoholic liquor to a minor and give a right of action by the parent
injured "in person or property" by an intoxicated person against the person who by
selling the liquor caused or contributed to the intoxication. ILL. RAv. STAT. ch. 43,§§ 131, 135 (1953).
49. Shepherd v. Marsaglia, 31 Ill. App. 2d 379, 176 N.E.2d 473 (1961). Money
used by the parents to pay expenses was found to be property within the meaning of
the Dram Shop Act, which allowed recovery for damages to property.
50. 159 Md. 229, 150 Atl. 720 (1930).
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to pay, the remedy is by a suit at law wherein he is entitled to
have a jury pass upon questions of fact, including the inquiry as
to whether the services were rendered, whether they were neces-
sary, and whether the charge was a reasonable . . . one.51
It should be noted that the Kriedo case imposes primary liability on a
father, notwithstanding a Maryland statute which imposes equal lia-
bility on both parents. 2
A more recent Maryland case, Hull v. Hull,55 citing the language
from Kriedo that proper recovery for such expenses was in an action
at law, refused to order medical support in futuro and deleted a pro-
vision for payment of all unusual medical and dental expenses of the
children from the support order.
LEGAL EXPENSES
Although it is within the court's discretion to require a father to
pay attorney's fees in custody suits or support proceedings,54 liability
for such fees and other legal expenses incurred is almost always im-
posed. Payment is often ordered made to the mother, whether she is
petitioner,55 or respondent,56 on the theory that the suit involved neces-
saries for the minor children, and therefore the legal expenses incurred
were themselves necessaries:
All of these [legal and accounting expenses] constitute necessaries
for the said infants which the plaintiff, as guardian ad litem,
supplied. The defendant is under the natural obligation to furnish
these necessaries for his infant children .... It is well settled that
necessaries are not limited to food, clothing, habitation, and educa-
tion but also include, among other things, the right of counsel.
There can be no doubt, as a matter of law, that legal service ren-
dered to an infant to enforce his right is a necessary for which
his father is liable.
57
An attorney may maintain a separate action against a father since he
represented the children, the real parties to the action.58
51. Id. at 233, 150 Atl. at 722. Duty of father to provide depends also on his
financial circumstances and the parties' station in life.
52. "The father and mother are the joint natural guardians of their minor child
and are jointly and severally charged with its support, care, nurture, welfare and
education." MD. COD ANN. art. 72A, § 1 (1957). "While this statute does not
mention 'medical care' in specific terms, we have no hesitancy in holding that it is
embraced within the scope of the broad language used." Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590,
596, 155 A.2d 684, 688 (1959). It should be noted that although the statute imposes
a joint duty, the primary duty for support rests on the father. Boyd v. Boyd, 177 Md.
687, 688, 11 A.2d 461, 465 (1940). This statute is identical to that construed to
include college education in Pass v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 118 So. 2d 769 (1960);
however, the Court of Appeals did not expressly mention it in reaching its decision in
Smith v. Smith, 227 Md. 355, 176 A.2d 862 (1962).
53. 201 Md. 225, 93 A.2d 536 (1953).
54. McDonald v. McDonald, 124 Mont. 26, 218 P.2d 929 (1950).
55. E.g., Simonds v. Simonds, 154 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Brown v. Brown,
233 Ark. 422, 345 S.W.2d 27 (1961); Matthews v. Matthews, 30 Misc. 2d 681, 222
N.Y.S.2d 31 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
56. Cone v. Cone, 68 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1953).
57. Matthews v. Matthews, 30 Misc. 2d 681, 222 N.Y.S.2d 31, 36 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
58. E.g., Friou v. Gentes, 11 App. Div. 2d 124, 204 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1960); see
Schwartz v. Jacob, 394 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
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Financial ability to pay may be a factor considered. Although
ordinarily the father has to pay attorney's fees even if the mother is
the losing party, ". . . the court -must take into consideration the
financial condition of the wife and the ability of the husband to pay; if
the parties are about equally able to pay their expense of litigation... "
then it is within the court's discretion to refuse imposition of liability
on a father. 9
In Carter v. Carter,6" the Maryland Court of Appeals exercised
its discretion not to require a father to pay fees of the attorney hired
by the mother. Custody of the minor child was divided between the
parties, and the father was successful in petitioning for modification of
the order to give him sole custody. The court stated that the scope of
necessaries might extend to ". . . the services of an attorney if reason-
able and necessary for the protection or enforcement of property rights
of the minor or his protection, liberty, or relief."'" However, the court
found that the mother's resistance of the father's petition was not in
the child's best interest but rather was in her own behalf, and that
therefore she could not recover money paid for the attorney's services.
The lower court in Price v. Price,6 2 a suit to enforce a support
order after much litigation concerning the psychiatric care of the par-
ties' minor son, awarded the mother $1,850 for attorney's fees. The
Court of Appeals stated that while it is sensible for equity to pass on
the necessity for services provided to an infant and to direct a father
to pay them, the action to enforce the liability must be at law. 3
Subsequently, in Price v. Perkins,6 4 the court, requiring the father to
pay $1,770 in fees to the attorney, quoted the lower court's findings:
" '... the Court finds that the services rendered by Mr. Perkins .. .
were necessaries furnished to the child. Certainly, the mental health
of Richard was of paramount importance.' "165
There are very few cases concerned with legal expenses incurred
for the defense of a minor child in his or her criminal prosecution. It
might, therefore, be supposed that most fathers voluntarily undertake
this duty. In Hill v. Childress,6 the court found that a father was not
required to pay an attorney whom he did not hire to defend his son in
a murder prosecution since ". . . he [was] by law only responsible for
necessaries furnished [his son], among which the services of an attor-
ney [could not] be ranked .. ."6' A New York court, however,
stated that legal services requested by a minor for defense in a criminal
prosecution were necessaries for which the father could be held re-
sponsible,6" and an Indiana court, in a petition by a minor for pro-
vision under -statutory authority of a criminal trial transcript for use
59. Shepard v. Shepard, 194 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Mo. App. 1946).
60. 156 Md. 500, 144 AtI. 490 (1929).
61. Id. at 509, 144 AtI. at 494.
62. 232 Md. 379, 194 A.2d 99 (1963).
63. Id. at 385, 194 A.2d at 102-03.
64. 242 Md. 501, 219 A.2d 557 (1966).
65. Id. at 503, 219 A.2d at 558.
66. 10 Yerg. (18 Tenn.) 514 (1837).
67. Id. at 515.
68. Griston v. Stousland, 186 Misc. 201, 60 N.Y.S.2d 118, 119 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
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in his appeal, said that such legal expense was a necessary which a
parent was obligated to provide if he was able to do so.69
MISCELLANEOUS
There is a paucity of decisions concerning liability of a father
for extraordinary necessaries, other than those in ,the areas of college
education, funeral, medical, and legal expenses. The reason for this
may be that most persons of ordinary means would not consider other
extraordinary items to be necessaries, whereas persons whose social
station and financial resources are such that they recognize such items
to be necessaries normally -would agree to their provision.
A New York court has found items purchased by a mother for
babysitters to be necessaries, as a form of compensation, and imposed
liability for their cost on the father."0
Pincus v. Pincus7 ' was an appeal from a contempt order in which,
under a support order which required payment of all costs incident to
the necessary and reasonable education of the minor children, the father
was ordered to pay the expenses incident to his 'son's bar mitzvah.72
The court held that since the original order did not expressly cover
bar 'mitzvah expenses such a finding was not properly made in a con-
tempt hearing and remanded the case for further findings of fact.
However, the court indicated that the expenses of religious instruc-
tion might properly 'be included within the language of the original
order and that while the reception expense probably could not be
classified as an educational expense the father might still be liable for
them depending upon his financial resources, the parties' position in
the community, and the custom of having such a reception. 73
That the father's financial circumstances and the station in life
of the parties are controlling is clearly shown in Hecht v. Hecht :7
The court below held.., that summer camps are a "luxury," and
that expenses of this nature may not be included in a support
order. In the case of most parents this would be true, but "neces-
saries" and "luxuries" are relative matters. . . . Children of
wealthy parents are entitled to the educational advantages of
travel, private lessons in music, drama, swimming, horseback
riding, and other activities in which they show interest and ability.
They are entitled to the best medical care, good clothes and famili-
arity with good restaurants, good hotels, good shows and good
camps.... A wealthy father has a legal duty to give his children the
"advantages" which his financial status indicates to be reasonable. 75
69. State ex rel. Butler v. Allen Circuit Court, 241 Ind. 627, 170 N.E.2d 663,
664 (1960).
70. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Seizer, 49 Misc. 2d 429, 267 N.Y.S.2d 774,
777-78 (Civ. Ct. 1965).
71. 197 A.2d 854 (D.C. App. 1964).
72. Religious instruction, $127.50; Printing, $22.87; Wine, $19.92; Flowers,$62.78; Religious school expenses, dues and books, $273.75; Reception, $1,045.88. Id.
at 856 n.1.
73. Id. at 856.
74. 189 Pa. Super. 276, 150 A.2d 139 (1959).




It appears that the current trend is for courts to declare expenses
incurred for the college education, funeral, legal assistance, and medical
care of minor children, which expenses were once considered extra-
ordinary, to be necessaries for which the minor's father is liable. This
is almost universally true concerning funeral and medical expenses and,
to a degree, legal expenses, although the latter still retains a more
discretionary status. College education, too, has come to be considered
a necessary in most circumstances.
A father's liability for expenses in all of these categories, however,
as well as for the basic common law necessaries, is qualified primarily
by his financial circumstances. In the case of college education, the
additional factors of station in life of the parties and the minor's
aptitude for higher education are considered. Some courts have im-
posed this liability on a father by simply extending the common law
concept of necessaries, while others have justified the extension under
a child support statute.76 The court in the principal case was apparently
unable to do either: it followed the Halsted7 7 precedent, even though
that decision was explicitly limited to its particular facts ;7' and it
apparently ignored a statute which should have permitted it to follow
the modern trend of authority.
76. The applicable Maryland statute is MD. CoD4 ANN. art. 72A, § 1 (1957).
See discussion note 52 supra.
77. Halsted v. Halsted, 228 App. Div. 298, 239 N.Y.S. 422 (1930).
78. "It may be that unusual circumstances might make the furnishing of a pro-
fessional or classical education to an infant a necessary, enforceable at law against a
parent, but that question is not here . . ." Id. at 424.
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